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Abstract. We study the deterministic and randomized query complex-
ity of finding approximate equilibria in a k× k bimatrix game. We show
that the deterministic query complexity of finding an -Nash equilib-
rium when  < 1
2
is Ω(k2), even in zero-one constant-sum games. In
combination with previous results [8], this provides a complete charac-
terization of the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash
equilibria. We also study randomized querying algorithms. We give a
randomized algorithm for finding a ( 3−
√
5
2
+ )-Nash equilibrium using
O( k·log k
2
) payoff queries, which shows that the 1
2
barrier for determinis-
tic algorithms can be broken by randomization. For well-supported Nash
equilibria (WSNE), we first give a randomized algorithm for finding an
-WSNE of a zero-sum bimatrix game using O( k·log k
4
) payoff queries, and
we then use this to obtain a randomized algorithm for finding a ( 2
3
+ )-
WSNE in a general bimatrix game usingO( k·log k
4
) payoff queries. Finally,
we initiate the study of lower bounds against randomized algorithms in
the context of bimatrix games, by showing that randomized algorithms
require Ω(k2) payoff queries in order to find an -Nash equilibrium with
 < 1
4k
, even in zero-one constant-sum games. In particular, this rules out
query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory, which
makes algorithms for finding Nash equilibria an important topic. A recent strand
of work [2, 3, 8, 11, 12] has studied this problem from the perspective of payoff
query complexity.
The payoff query model is motivated by practical applications of game theory.
In many practical applications it is often the case that we know that there is
a game to be solved, but we do not know what the payoffs are. In order to
discover the payoffs, we would have to play the game, and hence discover the
payoffs through experimentation. This may be quite costly, so it is natural to ask
whether we can find a Nash equilibrium of a game while minimising the number
of experiments that we must perform.
Payoff queries model this situation. In the payoff query model we are told the
structure of the game, ie. the strategy space, but we are not told the payoffs. We
are permitted to make payoff queries, where we propose a pure strategy profile,
and we are told the payoff to each player under that strategy profile. Our task is
to compute an equilibrium of the game while minimising the number of payoff
queries that we make.
An example of a practical application for payoff queries is empirical game
theoretic analysis. Wellman’s survey paper gives an overview of this [17], and
the paper of Fearnley et al. gives a detailed description of how payoff query
complexity is relevant [8].
This paper studies the payoff query complexity of finding equilibria in bima-
trix games. Previous work has shown that the deterministic query complexity
of finding an exact Nash equilibrium in a k × k bimatrix game is k2, even for
zero-one constant-sum games [8]. In other words, one cannot hope to find an
exact Nash equilibrium without querying all pure strategy profiles. Since query-
efficient algorithms for exact equilibria do not exist, this naturally raises the
question: what is the payoff query complexity of finding approximate equilibria?
There are two competing notions of approximate equilibrium for bimatrix
games. An exact Nash equilibrium requires that all players achieve their best-
response payoff, and thus have no incentive to deviate. An -Nash equilibrium
requires that each player receives a payoff that is within  of their best-response
payoff, and thus all players have only a small incentive to deviate. One problem
with this definition is that an -Nash equilibrium permits a player to place
a small amount of probability on a very bad strategy, and it is questionable
whether a rational player would actually want to do this. An -well supported
Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) rectifies this, by requiring that all players only place
probability on strategies that are within  of being a best-response.
Previous work by Fearnley, Gairing, Goldberg, and Savani [8] has shown
that an algorithm of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [7] can be adapted
to produce a deterministic algorithm that finds a 12 -Nash equilibrium using 2k−1
payoff queries. The same paper also shows that, for all i in the range 2 ≤ i < k,
the deterministic payoff query complexity of finding a (1− 1i )-Nash equilibrium
is at least k−i+1. Note, in particular, that this implies that for every constant 
in the range 12 ≤  < 1, the deterministic query complexity of finding an -Nash
equilibrium is Θ(k).
However, relatively little is known about the more interesting case of  < 12 .
A lower bound of Ω(k · log k) has been shown against deterministic algorithms
that find a O( 1log k )-Nash equilibrium [8]. For the special case of zero-sum games,
Goldberg and Roth have shown that an -Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum bima-
trix game can be found by a randomized algorithm that uses O(k·log k2 ) many
payoff queries [11].
Our contribution As we have mentioned, so far relatively little is known for the
deterministic query complexity of finding an -Nash equilibrium when  < 12 . We
address this with a lower bound: in Section 3 we show that, for every  > 0, the
deterministic payoff query complexity of finding a ( 12 − )-Nash equilibrium in a
k×k bimatrix game is Ω(k2). Our lower bound holds even for zero-one constant-
sum games. When combined with previous results, this provides a complete
characterization of the deterministic query complexity of -Nash equilibria when
 is constant: it is Θ(k) for  ≥ 12 , and Θ(k2) for  < 12 .
Since our lower bound rules out deterministic query-efficient algorithms for
finding ( 12 − )-Nash equilibria, it is natural to ask whether this threshold can be
broken through the use of randomization. In Section 6 we give a positive answer
to this question. Our approach is to take an algorithm of Bosse, Byrka, and
Markakis [4], and to apply the randomized algorithm of Goldberg and Roth [11]
in order to solve the zero-sum game used by the BBM algorithm. We show that
this produces a randomized algorithm that uses O(k·log k2 ) payoff queries and
finds a ( 3−
√
5
2 +)-Nash equilibrium in a k×k bimatrix game. Since 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.382,
this shows that randomization can be used to defeat the barrier at 0.5 that exists
for deterministic algorithms.
In Section 7, we turn our attention to approximate well-supported Nash
equilibria, which is a topic that has not previously been studied from the payoff
query perspective in the context of bimatrix games. We adapt the algorithm
of Kontogiannis and Spirakis for finding a 23 -WSNE in a bimatrix game [14],
and in doing so we obtain a randomized algorithm for finding a ( 23 + )-WSNE
using O(k·log k4 ) many payoff queries. Note that this almost matches the best
known polynomial-time algorithm for finding approximate well-supported Nash
equilibria: Fearnley, Goldberg, Savani, and Sørensen [9] have given a polynomial
time algorithm that finds a ( 23 − 0.004735)-WSNE.
As part of the proof of this result, we prove an interesting side result: there is a
randomized algorithm that finds an -WSNE of a zero-sum game using O(k·log k4 )
payoff queries. This complements the result of Goldberg and Roth for finding
-Nash equilibria in zero-sum games, and potentially could find applications
elsewhere.
Finally, we initiate the study of lower bounds against randomized algorithms
in the context of bimatrix games. In Section 4 we show that the randomized
query complexity of finding an -Nash equilibrium for  < 14k in a k×k bimatrix
game is Ω(k2). Again, our lower bound holds even for zero-one constant-sum
games. Note, in particular, that our lower bound rules out the existence of query-
efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact equilibria. This improves over
earlier results, which only considered deterministic algorithms for finding exact
Nash equilibria [8].
Related work Apart from the related work on bimatrix games that we have al-
ready mentioned, there have been a number of results on payoff query complexity
in the context of n-player strategic form games. Recently, Babichenko has shown
that there is a constant (but small)  for which the randomized query complexity
of finding an -well-supported Nash equilibrium in an n-player strategic form is
exponential in n [2].
The query complexity of finding approximate-correlated equilibria has been
studied in a pair of papers [3, 12], where it was shown that a randomized algo-
rithm can find approximate-correlated equilibria in polynomial time, but that
non-random algorithms require exponentially many queries, and that finding an
exact equilibrium requires exponentially many queries.
Finally, Goldberg and Roth have given a randomized algorithm that uses log-
arithmically many payoff queries in order to find approximate correlated equilib-
ria in binary-action n-player strategic form games, and they also give a matching
lower bound [11]. The same paper shows a linear lower bound for finding well-
supported approximate correlated Nash equilibria.
Of course, there has been much previous work studying approximate Nash
equilibria from the computational complexity point of view [4, 6, 7, 13, 16],
some of which we have drawn upon for our query complexity results. So far, the
best polynomial-time algorithm for finding -Nash equilibria was given by Tsak-
nakis and Spirakis, who showed that a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium can be found in
polynomial-time [16]. For well-supported approximate Nash equilibria, the first
result on the subject gave an algorithm for finding a 56 -WSNE in polynomial
time [7], but this only holds if a certain unproved graph-theoretic conjecture is
true. The best result until recently was by Kontogiannis and Spirakis, who gave
an algorithm for finding 23 -WSNE in polynomial time. The current best known
algorithm was given by Fearnley, Goldberg, Savani, and Sørensen [9] who, in a
slight improvement over previous work, produced a polynomial-time algorithm
for finding a ( 23 − 0.004735)-WSNE.
There has also been a line of work studying the support size requirements
for approximate Nash equilibria. It has been shown that every game has a 12 -
Nash equilibrium with support size 2 [7], but logarithmic support sizes are both
necessary [10] and sufficient [15] for -Nash equilibria with  < 12 . The threshold
of 12 , of course, also appears in our work on the deterministic query complexity
of approximate Nash equilibria.
A similar support-size threshold may exist for well-supported Nash equilibria
at 23 : it has been shown that -WSNE with  <
2
3 require super-constant support
sizes [1], whereas an as yet unproved graph theoretic conjecture would imply
that every game has a 23 -WSNE with support size 3 [7].
2 Preliminaries
Games and Strategies A k × k bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two k × k
matrices: R gives payoffs for the row player, and C gives payoffs for the column
player. We make the standard assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1].
For each n ∈ N, we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player has k pure
strategies. To play the game, both players simultaneously select a pure strategy:
the row player selects a row i ∈ [k], and the column player selects a column
j ∈ [k]. The row player then receives payoff Ri,j , and the column player receives
payoff Ci,j . We say that a bimatrix game (R,C) is a zero-one game, if all entries
of R and C are either 0 or 1. We say that (R,C) is constant-sum if there is a
constant c such that Ri,j + Ci,j = c, for all i, j ∈ [k].
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [k]. We denote a mixed
strategy for the row player as a row vector x of length k, such that xi is the
probability that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of
the column player is a column vector y of length k, with the same interpretation.
Given a mixed strategy x for either player, the support of x, denoted Supp(x),
is the set of pure strategies i with xi > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the
row and column player, respectively, then we call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile.
Solution Concepts Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a k × k bimatrix
game (R,C). We say that a row i ∈ [k] is a best response for the row player if
Ri · y = maxl∈[k]Rl · y. We say that a column j ∈ [k] is a best response for
the column player if (x · C)j = maxl∈[k](x · C)l. We define the regret suffered
by the row player to be the difference between the payoff that the row player
obtains under (x,y), and the payoff of a best response. More formally, the row
player’s regret is maxi∈[k](Ri ·y)−x ·R ·y. Similarly, the column player’s regret
is defined to be maxj∈[k]((x ·C)j)−x ·C ·y. The mixed strategy profile (x,y) is a
mixed Nash equilibrium if both players have regret 0 under (x,y). Note that this
is equivalent to saying that every pure strategy in Supp(x) is a best response
against y, and every pure strategy in Supp(y) is a best response against x.
The two approximate solution concepts that we study in this paper both
weaken the requirements of a mixed Nash equilibrium, but in different ways.
An -Nash equilibrium is an approximate solution concept that weakens the
regret based definition of a mixed Nash equilibrium. For every  ∈ [0, 1], a mixed
strategy profile (x,y) is an -Nash equilibrium if both player suffer regret at
most  under (x,y).
An -well supported Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) weakens the best-response
definition of a mixed Nash equilibrium. A strategy i ∈ [k] is an -best response
against y if:
Ri · y ≥ max
l∈[k]
(Rl · y)− .
Similarly, a strategy j ∈ [k] is an -best response against x if:
(x · C)j ≥ max
l∈[k]
((x · C)l)− .
For every  ∈ [0, 1], a mixed strategy profile (x,y) is an -WSNE if every pure
strategy in Supp(x) is an -best response against y, and every pure strategy in
Supp(y) is an -best response against x. Note that every -WSNE is an -Nash
equilibrium, but that the converse does not hold.
Payoff Queries In the payoff query model, an algorithm initially only knows the
size of the game, but does not know the payoffs. That is, the algorithm knows
that (R,C) is a k× k bimatrix game, but it does not know any of the payoffs in
R or C. In order to discover the payoffs, the algorithm must make payoff queries.
A payoff query is a pair (i, j) where i ∈ [k] is a pure strategy of the row player,
and j ∈ [k] is a pure strategy of the column player. When an algorithm makes
a payoff query (i, j), it receives a pair (a, b) where a = Ri,j is the row player
payoff and b = Ci,j is the column player payoff.
3 An Ω(k2) lower bound against deterministic algorithms
for finding (1
2
− )-Nash equilibria
In this section, we show that for every  > 0, no deterministic algorithm can find
a ( 12−)-Nash equilibrium in a k×k bimatrix with strictly less than 2 ·k2 queries.
Thus, we show that the deterministic query complexity of finding a ( 12 − )-Nash
equilibrium is Ω(k2) for all  > 0. This lower bound holds even for zero-one
constant-sum games.
Our proof will take the form of an algorithm interacting with an adversary,
who will respond to the payoff queries that are made by the algorithm. The fun-
damental idea behind our lower bound is that the adversary will hide a column
c such that Ci,c = 1 for all i ∈ [k]. Thus, column c always has payoff 1 for the
column player, no matter what strategy the row player is using. Our goal is to
show that the column player must place a significant amount of probability on
c in order to be in a ( 12 − )-Nash equilibrium.
We now define our adversary strategy. For each payoff query (i, j), we respond
according to the following rules:
– If column j has received strictly less than ·k payoff queries, then we respond
with (0, 1).
– If column j has received at least  · k payoff queries, then we respond with
(1, 0).
The result of the interaction between the algorithm and the adversary is a partial
bimatrix game, which is a bimatrix game (R,C) where Ri,j and Ci,j are defined
only for the pairs (i, j) that have received a payoff query.
The idea behind this strategy is that, if an algorithm makes strictly less than
 · k payoff queries in a column j, then it cannot rule out the possibility that
j is the hidden column c. Crucially, if an algorithm makes strictly less than

2 ·k2 payoff queries overall, then there will be strictly more than k2 columns that
receive strictly less than  ·k payoff queries, and thus, there will be strictly more
than k2 possible candidates for the hidden column.
So, suppose that an algorithm made strictly less than 2 · k2 payoff queries
and then produced a mixed strategy profile (x,y) which is purported to be a
( 12 − )-Nash equilibrium. We will construct a game that is consistent with every
query made by the algorithm, such that (x,y) is not a ( 12 − )-Nash equilibrium
of this game.
Let (R′, C ′) be the partial bimatrix game that corresponds to the queries
made by the algorithm. We will extend (R′, C ′) to a fully defined bimatrix game
(R,C) as follows:
– We first place the hidden column. To do so, we pick a column c with yc <
2
k ,
such that c has received strictly less than  · k payoff queries. Since strictly
more than k2 columns received strictly less than  · k payoff queries, such a
column is guaranteed to exist. We set Ri,c = 0 and Ci,c = 1 for all i ∈ [k].
– For each column j 6= c, we set all unqueried elements of j to be (1, 0). More
formally, for each column j 6= c and each i ∈ [k], we set
Ri,j =
{
R′i,j if R
′
i,j is defined.
1 otherwise,
and we set Ci,j = 1−Ri,j .
Note that (R,C) is a zero-one constant-sum bimatrix game. The mixed strategy
profile (x,y) and the bimatrix game (R,C) will be fixed for the rest of this
section. Observe that, by construction, we have ensured that y plays c with
low probability. We will exploit this to show that (x,y) is not a ( 12 − )-Nash
equilibrium in (R,C).
In our first lemma, we give a lower bound on the row player’s best response
payoff against y.
Lemma 1. The row player’s best response payoff against y in (R,C) is at least
1− − 2k .
Proof. Consider a strategy x′ that mixes uniformly over all rows. Let j be a
column such that j 6= c. By definition, we have that there are at most  · k rows
i in j that satisfy Ci,j = 1, and there are at least k −  · k rows i in j that
satisfy Ci,j = 0. Therefore, since x
′ plays each row with probability 1k , we have
(x′ ·C)j ≤ . Note that y plays c with probability at most 2k . Therefore, we have
the following bound on the payoff of y against x′:
x′ · C · y = yc · (x′ · C)c +
∑
j 6=c
yj · (x′ · C)j
≤ 2
k
+
∑
j 6=c
yj · 
≤ 2
k
+ .
Since the game is constant sum, this implies that the payoff of x′ against y is
at least 1− − 2k . Therefore, the row player’s best response against y must also
have payoff at least 1− − 2k . uunionsq
We now use the previous lemma to show that, provided that 2k < , the mixed
strategy profile (x,y) cannot be a ( 12 − )-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. If 2k < , then (x,y) is not a (
1
2 − )-Nash equilibrium in (R,C).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (x,y) is a ( 12 − )-Nash equi-
librium in (R,C). By Lemma 1, the row player’s best response payoff against y
is at least 1− − 2k . Since, by assumption, the regret of the row player is at most
1
2 − , the payoff of x against y must be at least:(
1− − 2
k
)
−
(
1
2
− 
)
=
1
2
− 2
k
.
Since the game is constant sum, this then implies that the payoff of y against x
is at most 12 +
2
k . But, since the payoff of column c is always 1, the payoff of y
against x must be at least 1 − ( 12 − ) = 12 + . Thus, we have a contradiction
whenever 2k < . uunionsq
Note that the precondition of Lemma 2 is equivalent to k > 2 . Therefore
this lemma shows that, for every  > 0, there exists a k′ such that, for all
k ≥ k′ no deterministic algorithm can find a (12 − )-Nash equilibrium in a k× k
bimatrix game with strictly less than 2 · k payoff queries. Thus, we have shown
the following theorem, which is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. The deterministic query complexity of finding a ( 12−)-Nash equi-
librium is Ω(k2), even in zero-one constant-sum games.
4 An Ω(k2) lower bound against randomized algorithms
for finding -Nash equilibria for  < 1
4k
In this section, we show that no randomized algorithm can find a -Nash equilib-
rium with  < 14k while making o(k
2) playoff queries, even in zero-one constant-
sum games.
At a high level, our technique is similar to the one we used for our determinis-
tic lower bound in in Section 3: we will hide a column c such that Ci,c = 1 for all
i ∈ [k]. In this case however, instead of using an adversary, we use a probability
distribution over games. For each column j 6= c, we will select a single row rj
uniformly at random, and set Rrj ,j = 1 and Crj ,j = 0. For each row i 6= rj we
will set Ri,j = 0 and Ci,j = 1. Thus, in order to distinguish between column c,
and a column j 6= c, the algorithm must find the row rj , and as we will show,
even randomized algorithms cannot do this in a query efficient manner.
Formally, we define Gk to be a random distribution over zero-one constant-
sum k × k bimatrix games, defined in the following way. To draw a game from
Gk, we first choose a column c ∈ [k] uniformly at random, which will be referred
to as the hidden column. Furthermore, we choose r1, r2, . . . , rk to be k uniformly
and independently chosen rows (which may include repeats). Then we construct
the game (R,C), where for all i, j ∈ [k] we have:
Ci,j =

1 if j = c,
0 if j 6= c and rj = i,
1 otherwise.
We define Ri,j = 1− Ci,j for all i, j ∈ [k].
We show that if (x,y) is a strategy profile in which y does not assign strictly
more than 12 probability to the hidden column c, then (x,y) is not an -Nash
equilibrium with  < 14k . Since y can assign strictly more than
1
2 probability to
at most one column, this implies that any algorithm that produces an -Nash
equilibrium with  < 14k must find the hidden column. The following lemma
shows that this property holds for all games in the support of the distribution
Gk.
Lemma 3. Let (R,C) be a game drawn from Gk, where c is the hidden column.
If (x,y) is an -Nash equilibrium with  < 14k in (R,C), then yc >
1
2 .
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that (x,y) is an -Nash equilibrium
with  < 14k in (R,C) and that yc ≤ 12 . We begin by arguing that the row
player’s best response payoff against y is at least 12k . To see this, let x
′ be a row-
player strategy that mixes uniformly over all rows. Consider a column j 6= c,
and observe that by construction, column j contains exactly one 0 entry for the
column player. Therefore, we have (C · x′)j = 1 − 1k . Since y assigns at least 12
probability to columns other than c, we have that the payoff of y against x′ is
at most:
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· (1− 1
k
) = 1− 1
2k
.
Since the game is constant-sum, this then implies that the payoff of x′ against
y is at least 12k .
Since the row player’s best response payoff against y must be at least 12k ,
and since (x,y) is an -Nash equilibrium with  < 14k , we have that the payoff of
x against y is at least 12k − . Since the game is constant-sum, this then implies
that the payoff of y against x is at most 1− 12k + . However, since the column
player can obtain a payoff of 1 by playing column c, we have shown that the
regret of y is at least 12k −  > 14k > . Therefore, we have a contradiction with
the fact that (x,y) is an -Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Recall that our goal is to show that randomized algorithms cannot determine
if a column is the hidden column in a query efficient manner for the games in
Gk. In the next lemma, we will formalise this idea. Suppose that our algorithm
makes a series of randomized queries. For each column j, we will use Aj to be
an indicator variable for the event “the algorithm did not find a row i such
that Ci,j = 0”. Intuitively, if Aj = 1, then the algorithm cannot rule out the
possibility that column j is the hidden column. The following lemma gives a
simple bound on the probability of Aj .
Lemma 4. Let (R,C) be a game drawn from Gk. Suppose that an algorithm
makes f(k) queries in column j. We have Pr(Aj = 1) ≥ 1− f(k)k .
Proof. If j = c, then Pr(Aj = 1) = 1, and the lemma holds. Otherwise, since
the row rj was chosen uniformly at random, if we make f(k) queries in column
j, then we find rj with probability
f(k)
k . Therefore Pr(Aj = 1) = 1− f(k)k . uunionsq
Note that, if f(k) ∈ o(k), then 1− f(k)k tends to 1 as k tends to infinity. Thus
we will have Aj = 1 almost always, and j will be indistinguishable from c. In
the following lemma, we use this fact to show our lower bound. In particular,
we show that no algorithm that makes o(k2) payoff queries can succeed with a
positive constant probability.
Lemma 5. Any algorithm that makes o(k2) payoff queries cannot find an -
Nash equilibrium, where  < 14k , with positive constant probability against the
distribution Gk for all k.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there does exist an algorithm that makes
at most g(k) ∈ o(k2) payoff queries, and when it is run against the distribution
Gk, it finds an -Nash equilibrium, where  < 14k , with probability at least 3 · δ,
for constant δ ∈ (0, 13 ]. We consider the outcome when the algorithm is presented
with the distribution Gk, for some k that will later be varied. Let  < 14k , and
let (x,y) be the purported -Nash equilibrium found by the algorithm when it
is run against Gk.
Note that at least k− δ · k columns must receive o(k) payoff queries, because
otherwise δ · k columns would receive Ω(k) payoff queries, giving Ω(k2) payoff
queries in total. Thus, there must exist a set S of columns, with |S| = k − δ · k,
and a function f(k) ∈ o(k), such that each column in S received at most f(k)
payoff queries.
Let S′ ⊆ S be the set of columns in S such that Aj = 1. Recall that, for
each column j in S′, the algorithm cannot distinguish between j and c. We now
prove a lower bound on the size of S′. By Lemma 4, we have that if j ∈ S, then
E[Aj ] ≥ 1− f(k)k . Define A =
∑
j∈S Aj , and note that by linearity of expectations
we have:
E[A] ≥ (k − δ · k) · (1− f(k)
k
)
Since each of the events corresponding to Aj are independent, we can apply
Hoeffding’s inequality to obtain:
Pr(|A− E[A]| ≥ δ · k) ≤ 2 · exp(−2 · (δ · k)
2
k − δk )
Thus, with probability at least 1− 2 · exp(− 2·(δ·k)2k−δk ) we have that S′ contains at
least
(k − δ · k) · (1− f(k)
k
)− δ · k
columns.
Let us focus on the case where S′ contains at least this many columns. Note
that y can assign strictly more than 12 probability to at most one column in
S′, and therefore there are at least |S′| − 1 columns in S′ that are not assigned
strictly more than 12 probability by y. Since c is chosen uniformly at random,
and since the hidden column could be any of the columns in S′, we have that
yc ≤ 12 with probability at least:
(|S′| − 1) · 1
k
=
(k − δ · k) · (1− f(k)k )− δ · k − 1
k
= (1− δ) · (1− f(k)
k
)− δ − 1
k
.
By Lemma 3, if yc ≤ 12 , then (x,y) is not an -Nash equilibrium.
In summary, we have that (x,y) is not a -Nash equilibrium with probability
at least (
1− 2 · exp(−2 · (δ · k)
2
k − δk )
)
·
(
(1− δ) · (1− f(k)
k
)− δ − 1
k
)
,
where the first term is the probability that S′ contains enough columns, and the
second term is the probability that yc ≤ 12 . As k tends to infinity, we have that
exp(− 2·(δ·k)2k−δk ) tends to 0, and since f(k) ∈ o(k), we have that f(k)k tends to 0.
Thus, the entire expression tends to 1 − 2 · δ. Thus, for large k, the algorithm
will fail with probability strictly greater than 1 − 3 · δ, which contradicts our
assumption that the algorithm succeeds with probability at least 3 · δ for all
k. uunionsq
Lemma 5 shows that every algorithm that makes o(k2) payoff queries on a
game drawn from Gk will fail to find an -Nash equilibrium, where  < 14k , with
probability tending to 1 as k tends to infinity. Moreover, recall that all games
in Gk are zero-one constant-sum games. Therefore, we have shown the following
theorem, which is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. The randomized query complexity of finding an -Nash equilibrium
for  < 14k is Ω(k
2), even in zero-one constant-sum games.
5 Zero-sum Games
We now turn our attention to showing upper bounds. In Sections 6 and 7, we
will give query efficient randomized algorithms for finding ( 3−
√
5
2 + )-Nash equi-
libria, and (23 + )-WSNE, respectively. In this section, we give some preliminary
results on zero-sum games, which are required for our later results: the result
in Section 6 requires us to find an -Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, and
the result in Section 7 requires us to find an -WSNE of a zero-sum game. In
Section 5.1, we present the previous work of Goldberg and Roth [11], which pro-
vides a randomized query-efficient algorithm for finding an -Nash equilibrium
in a zero-sum game, and in Section 5.2, we show how this can be converted into
a randomized query-efficient algorithm for finding an -WSNE in a zero-sum
game.
Recall that we assumed that all bimatrix game payoffs lie in the range [0, 1].
The two algorithms that we adapt both solve games that meet this assumption.
In doing so, both algorithms create and solve a derived zero-sum game with
payoffs lying in the range [−1, 1]. Thus, for the sake of convenience, during this
section on zero-sum games, we assume that all payoffs lie in the range [−1, 1].
5.1 A randomized algorithm for finding an -Nash equilibrium of a
zero-sum game
The following theorem, shown by Goldberg and Roth [11] using using multi-
plicative weights update no-regret algorithms, states that we have a randomized
O(k·log k2 ) payoff query algorithm that finds an -Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum
game.
Theorem 3 ([11]). An -Nash equilibrium in a k × k zero-sum bimatrix game
can, with probability 1− k− 18 , be computed using O(k·log k2 ) payoff queries.
When we apply this result, we will also need to know the payoff vectors for
both players. We now give a randomized O(k·log k2 ) algorithm for discovering
approximate payoff vectors. Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a k × k
bimatrix game (R,C). We say that a k-dimensional vector r is an -approximate
payoff vector for the row player if, for each i ∈ [k], we have |ri − Ri · y| ≤ .
Similarly, we say that a k-dimensional vector c is an -approximate payoff vector
for the column player if, for each j ∈ [k], we have |cj−(x·C)j | ≤ . The following
lemma shows that we can use a randomized algorithm to find an -approximate
payoff vector for the row player using O(k·log k2 ) payoff queries.
Lemma 6. Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a k×k bimatrix game (R,C).
With probability at least 1 − 2k we can find an -approximate payoff vector for
the row player using O(k·log k2 ) payoff queries.
Proof. We begin by giving a randomized method for finding the payoff of a fixed
row i ∈ [k] with probability 1− 2k2 using 4·ln k2 many payoff queries. We will make
T = 4·ln k2 many payoff queries along row i, chosen according to the probability
distribution y. Let X1, X2, . . . , XT be the result of these queries, and define
X = 1T (X1 +X2 + · · ·+XT ). Applying Hoeffding’s inequality, and noting that
all payoffs lie in the range [−1, 1], gives:
Pr(|X −Ri · y| ≥ ) ≤ 2 · exp(−2 · T · 
2
(1 + 1)2
)
= 2 · exp(−2 · ln k)
=
2
k2
.
Thus, with probability 1− 2k2 , we have that X is within  of (R · y)i.
Now, to find an -approximation of the row player’s payoffs, we simply ap-
ply the above method separately for each row i ∈ [k]. Clearly, this will use
O(k·ln k2 ) many payoff queries. The probability that we correctly compute an
-approximation of the row player’s payoffs is:(
1− 2
k2
)k
≥ 1−
(
k
1
)
· 2
k2
= 1− 2
k
.
This completes the proof. uunionsq
Note that, since we can swap the roles of the two players, Lemma 6 can also
be used to find an -approximate payoff vector for the column player. Combining
Lemma 6 with Theorem 3 gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given a k × k zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability at least
(1−k− 18 )(1− 2k )2, we can compute an -Nash equilibrium (x,y), and -approximate
payoff vectors for both players under (x,y), using O(k·log k2 ) payoff queries.
We now introduce further notation for working with approximate payoff vec-
tors. Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a bimatrix game (R,C). Let r and
c be -approximate payoff vectors for the row and column player, respectively.
We say that a row i is a best response according to r if ri = maxl∈[k] rl, and
that a column j is a best response according to c if cj = maxl∈[k] cl. We will
frequently use the fact that, if i is a best response according to r, and if i′ is an
actual best response against y, then:
|ri −Ri′ · y| ≤ . (1)
This is because, if ri > Ri′ · y + , then Ri · y > Ri′ · y, which would contradict
the fact that i′ is a best response, and if ri < Ri′ · y +  then ri < ri′ , which
would contradict the fact that i is a best response according to r. If row i is a
best response according to r, then we define the row player’s regret according to
r to be ri − x · r. Similarly, if column j is a best response according to c, then
we define the regret according to c to be cj − c · y. Note that, if i is an actual
best response against y, then we have: |(r− x · r)− (Ri · y− x ·R · y)| ≤ 2. In
other words, the regret according to r is within 2 of the actual regret suffered
by the row player under (x,y).
5.2 A randomized algorithm for finding an -WSNE of a zero-sum
game
In this section, we give a randomized query efficient algorithm for finding ap-
proximate well-supported Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. Our approach is
to first compute an approximate Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game using
Corollary 1, and to then convert this into an -WSNE for the zero-sum game.
Chen, Deng, and Teng have given an algorithm (henceforth referred to as the
CDT algorithm) that takes a 
2
8 -Nash equilibrium of a game, and in polynomial-
time finds an -WSNE for that game [5]. However, their method requires that
we know the payoff of every pure strategy in the 
2
8 -Nash equilibrium. In our
setting, we only know approximate payoff vectors for both players, so the CDT
algorithm cannot be directly applied. In the next lemma, we show a variant
of their result, which can be applied when we only know approximate payoff
vectors.
Lemma 7. Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game, let (x,y) be an 
2
24 -Nash equilibrium
of (R,C), and let r and c be 
2
24 -approximate payoff vectors for the row and
column player under (x,y). Without making any payoff queries, we can construct
an -WSNE of (R,C).
Proof. Let i∗ be an actual best response against y, and let l∗ be a best response
according to r. We define the set B = {l : rl∗ > rl + 4}, and our first task is to
show that B contains every row l that is not a 2 -best response against y.
Note that |rl∗−Ri∗ ·y| ≤ 224 . Furthermore, note that for every row l we have:
Ri∗ · y −Rl · y ≤ rl∗ − rl + 
2
12
.
Therefore, if row l satisfies rl∗ ≤ rl + 4 then:
Ri∗ · y −Rl · y ≤ 
4
+
2
12
≤ 
2
.
This implies that l is an 2 -best response against y. So, the set B must contain
every row l that is not an 2 -best response against y.
Define the random variable Y = Ri∗ · y − x · R · y and the random variable
X = rl∗−x·rl. Note that, since x is a 224 -Nash equilibrium, we know that the row
player suffers regret at most 
2
24 under (x,y), and therefore we have E[Y ] ≤ 
2
24 .
Furthermore, since X is the regret according to r, we know that:
E[X] ≤ E[Y ] + 
2
12
≤ 
2
8
.
By applying Markov’s inequality, we obtain:
Pr(X ≥ 
4
) ≤ 
2
8
/

4
=

2
.
Therefore, x must assign at most 2 probability to rows in B. We define x
′ to
be a modification of x where all probability assigned to rows in B is is shifted
arbitrarily to rows that are not in B.
Now consider the column player. If j∗ is a best response according to c and
we define B′ = {j : cj∗ > cj + 4}, then we can use the same argument as above
to prove that B′ contains every column that is not a 2 -best response against x,
and that the column player assigns at most 2 probability to the columns in B
′.
Similarly, we define y′ to be a modification of y where all probability assigned
to columns in B′ is shifted arbitrarily to columns not in B′.
Note that every row in Supp(x′) is a 2 -best response against y. Since y
′
differs from y by a shift of at most 2 probability, we have that every row in
Supp(x′) is an -best response against y′. Using the same technique, we can
argue that every row in Supp(y′) is an -best response against x′, and therefore
(x′,y′) is an -WSNE. uunionsq
By using the reduction from Lemma 7, it is now easy to see that we can
compute an -WSNE of a zero-sum bimatrix game. The following corollary is a
combination of Corollary 1 and Lemma 7.
Corollary 2. Given a k × k zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability at least
(1 − k− 18 )(1 − 2k )2, we can compute an -WSNE (x,y) using O(k·log k4 ) payoff
queries.
6 A randomized algorithm for finding a (3−
√
5
2
+ )-Nash
equilibrium
In this section, we present a randomized payoff-query efficient algorithm for
finding a (3−
√
5
2 +)-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game, where
3−√5
2 ≈ 0.38197.
We adapt an algorithm of Bosse, Byrka, and Markakis [4] (henceforth referred to
as the BBM algorithm) for finding a ( 3−
√
5
2 + )-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix
game. The BBM algorithm solves a zero-sum game, and then makes a decision
based on the regret suffered by the players. We must adapt the algorithm to
work with approximate payoff vectors.
Let (R,C) be a k × k bimatrix game, and define D = R − C. Let α ∈ [0, 1]
be a parameter that will be fixed later. The algorithm is as follows.
1. Apply Theorem 3 for 4 to the game (D,−D) in order to obtain (x,y),
which is a 4 -Nash equilibrium. Then apply Lemma 6 in order to find r and
c, which are 4 -approximate payoff vectors for when (x,y) is played in the
game (R,C). This step succeeds with probability (1−k− 18 )(1− 2k )2 and uses
O(k·log k2 ) payoff queries.
2. We will assume, without loss of generality, that the regret according to r is
larger than the regret according to c. Let row b be a best response according
to r in the game (R,C), and let g be the regret according to r. Since b and
g are determined by r, this step requires no payoff queries.
3. Let d be a best response for the column player against row b in the game
(R,C). This can be found using k payoff queries, by querying every column
in row b.
4. If g ≤ α, then output (x,y). Otherwise, let δ = 1−g2−g and output the following
strategy, denoted as (xˆ, yˆ): the row player plays b as a pure strategy, and
the column player plays y with probability (1− δ) and d with probability δ.
This step uses no payoff queries.
The following lemma shows that this algorithm is correct, in the case The-
orem 3 succeeds in finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of (D,−D), and
Lemma 6 succeeds in finding the approximate payoff vectors in (R,C).
Lemma 8. If (x,y) is a 4 -Nash equilibrium of (D,−D), and r and c are 4 -
approximate payoff vectors for (x,y) in (R,C), then the algorithm outputs a
(max(α, 1−α2−α ) + )-Nash equilibrium of (R,C).
Proof. First consider the case where g ≤ α. Let i be a best response for the row
player against y. By applying Equation (1), we can obtain the following bound
on the row player’s regret:
Ri · y − x ·R · y ≤ rb − x · r + 
2
= g +

2
≤ α+ 
2
Thus, the row player’s regret at most α+ 2 under (x,y). Since, by assumption,
the regret according to c is at most g, we can use the same argument to prove
that the column player’s regret is at most α+ 2 . Therefore, (x,y) is a (α+

2 )-
Nash equilibrium.
We now consider the case where g > α. We first consider the row player. Let
bˆ be a best response against yˆ. The row player’s regret in (xˆ, yˆ) is:
Rbˆ · yˆ −Rb · yˆ = (1− δ)(Rbˆ · y −Rb · y) + δ · (Rbˆ,d −Rb,d)
≤ (1− δ)(rbˆ − rb +

2
) + δ · (Rbˆ,d −Rb,d)
≤ (1− δ) · 
2
+ δ · (Rbˆ,d −Rb,d)
≤ 
2
+ δ.
The first inequality holds because r is is an 4 -approximate payoff vector against y.
The second inequality holds because b = maxi∈[k] ri. The third inequality holds
because 1− δ ≤ 1 and Ri,j ∈ [0, 1] for all i and j.
So, we have shown that the row player’s regret is at most
δ +

2
=
1− g
2− g +

2
≤ 1− α
2− α +

2
The inequality above holds because 1−g2−g is a decreasing function when g ≤ 1,
and because g > α.
We now consider the column player. Since (x,y) is an 4 -Nash equilibrium
of (D,−D), the row player’s regret under (x,y) in (D,−D) must be at most 4 .
Thus, all rows i must satisfy Di · y ≤ x ·D · y + 4 . Applying this inequality for
row b gives the following:
Db · y ≤ x ·D · y + 
4
(R− C)b · y ≤ x · (R− C) · y + 
4
Rb · y − x ·R · y + x · C · y − 
4
≤ Cb · y (2)
Since r is a 4 -approximate payoff vector we have:
Rb · y − x ·R · y ≥ rb − x · r− 
2
= g − 
2
Substituting this into Equation (2)
Cb · y ≥ g + x · C · y − 3
4

≥ g −  (3)
Recall that d is an actual best response against b for the column player. Since
xˆ plays b as a pure strategy, we have therefore have that d is a best response
against xˆ. Moreover, observe that
(1− δ)(1− g) = (1− g)(2− g) + (1− g)
2
2− g
=
1− g
2− g . (4)
Thus, the column player’s regret when playing yˆ against xˆ is:
(xˆ · C)d − xˆ · C · yˆ = Cb,d − Cb · yˆ
= Cb,d − ((1− δ) · Cb · y + δ · Cb,d)
= (1− δ)(Cb,d − Cb · y)
≤ (1− δ)(1− g + ) [By Equation (3)]
≤ 1− g
2− g +  [By Equation (4)]
<
1− α
2− α + .
We have now shown that, in the case where g > α, both players have regret at
most 1−α2−α + , which implies that (xˆ, yˆ) is a (
1−α
2−α + )-Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
As shown by Bosse, Byrka, and Markakis, we have that the expression max(α, 1−α2−α )
is minimized when α = 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.38197. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given a k×k bimatrix game, with probability at least (1−k− 18 )(1−
2
k )
2, we can compute a ( 3−
√
5
2 + )-Nash equilibrium using O(
k·log k
2 ) payoff
queries.
7 A randomized algorithm for finding finding a
(2
3
+ )-well-supported Nash equilibrium
In this section, we give a randomized O(k·log k4 ) payoff query algorithm for find-
ing a (23 + )-WSNE equilibrium in a bimatrix game, and we give a randomized
O(k·log k4 ) payoff query algorithm for finding a (
1
2 + )-WSNE in a zero-one bi-
matrix game. We follow the algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis (henceforth
referred to as the KS algorithm) for finding a 23 -WSNE in a bimatrix game [14].
Their approach can be summarised as follows: they first perform a preprocessing
step in which they check whether the game has a pure 23 -WSNE. If it does not,
then they construct a zero-sum game and compute an exact Nash equilibrium
for it. They show that, if the original game does not have a pure 23 -WSNE, then
an exact Nash equilibrium in the zero-sum game is a 23 -WSNE in the original
game.
There are two problems with this approach in the payoff query setting.
Firstly, it has been shown that finding an exact Nash equilibrium of a k × k
zero-sum game requires k2 queries [8]. To solve this problem, we substitute an
-WSNE of the zero-sum game in place of an exact Nash equilibrium, and we
show that, after this substitution, the KS algorithm will still produce a well-
supported Nash equilibrium of the original game. The second problem is that
we are unable to perform the preprocessing step in a query-efficient manner. A
naive algorithm would require k2 payoff queries in order to verify whether there
is a pure 23 -WSNE, and it is not clear how this can be improved. To solve this
problem, we show that the preprocessing step does not need to be carried out
before the zero-sum game has been solved. Instead, we find an -WSNE in the
zero-sum game, and then check whether it is a 23 -WSNE in the original. If it is
not, then we show how this information can be used to find a pure ( 23 +)-WSNE
in the original game.
Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game, where R is the payoff matrix of the row
player, and C is the payoff matrix of the column player. The KS algorithm uses
the following definitions.
D :=
1
2
(R− C) X := −1
2
(R+ C)
Observe that D = R+X. The KS algorithm finds an exact Nash equilibrium of
the zero-sum game (D,−D). In contrast to this, we do the following:
– we will apply Corollary 2 to (D,−D) to obtain an 10 -WSNE for (D,−D),
which we denote as (x,y).
– We then obtain approximate payoff vectors for when (x,y) is played in
(R,C): we apply Lemma 6 to obtain 10 -approximate payoff vectors r, which
approximates R · y, and c, which approximates x · C.
These two steps succeed with probability at least (1− k− 18 )(1− 2k )3. We will fix
(x,y), r, and c for the rest of this section.
In the following lemma, we show how the preprocessing of the KS algorithm
can be delayed until after the zero-sum game has been solved. In particular,
we show that if there is a row in the support of x that is far from being an
approximate best response, then, in a query-efficient manner, we can find a pure
strategy profile i, j ∈ [k] such that (R+C)i,j is large. The parameter z will allow
us to apply this lemma for both the zero-one and general bimatrix games: in the
zero-one case we will set z = 0.5, and for general bimatrix games we will set
z = 23 .
Lemma 9. Let z ∈ [0, 1]. If there is an i′ ∈ Supp(x) and i ∈ [k] such that
ri > ri′ + z − 5 , then using k payoff queries, we can find a j ∈ [k] such that
(R+ C)i,j > 2z − .
Proof. Since r is an 10 -approximate payoff vector for the row player, and since
ri > ri′ + z − 5 we have:
Ri · y > Ri′ · y + z − 2
5
. (5)
Since (x,y) is an 10 -WSNE in (D,−D), and since i′ ∈ Supp(x) by assumption,
we have:
Di′ · y ≥ Di · y − 
10
(R+X)i′ · y ≥ (R+X)i · y − 
10
Ri′ · y ≥ Ri · y − (Xi′ −Xi) · y − 
10
.
Combining this with Equation (5) yields:
Ri′ · y > Ri′ · y + z − 2
5
− (Xi′ −Xi) · y − 
10
(Xi′ −Xi) · y > z − 
2
.
Since X = − 12 (R + C), we have that Xi′ · y ∈ [−1, 0] and hence Xi′ · y ≤ 0.
Therefore, we have:
−Xi · y > z − 
2
1
2
(R+ C)i · y > z − 
2
(R+ C)i · y > 2z − .
In order for this inequality to hold, there must be at least one column j such
that (R + C)i,j > 2z − . Since we know row i, we can find column j using k
payoff queries. uunionsq
Note that, by swapping the roles of the two players, Lemma 9 can also be
applied for the column player. We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. Let (R,C) be a k × k bimatrix game. With probability at least
(1 − k− 18 )(1 − 2k )3 and using O(k·log k4 ) we can compute a ( 23 + )-WSNE if
(R,C) is a general bimatrix game, or a ( 12 + )-WSNE if (R,C) is a zero-one
bimatrix game.
Proof. As we have described, the algorithm spends O(k·log k4 ) in order to compute
(x,y), r, and c. We first prove the result for general bimatrix games. Observe
that, since since r is an 10 -approximate payoff vector, if we have ri ≤ ri′ + 23 − 5
for two rows i, i′ ∈ [k], then we have Ri · y ≤ Ri′ + 23 . So, our algorithm will
check whether:
– ri ≤ ri′ + 23 − 5 for every i ∈ [k] and every i′ ∈ Supp(x), and
– cj ≤ cj′ + 23 − 5 for every j ∈ [k] and every j′ ∈ Supp(y).
If both of these checks succeed, then (x,y) is a 23 -WSNE in (R,C), and we are
done. On the other hand, if either of the two checks fail, then we can apply
Lemma 9 to obtain a pair i, j ∈ [k] such that (R + C)i,j > 43 − . This implies
that both Ri,j >
1
3 −  and Ci,j > 13 − , and therefore i and j form a pure
( 23 + )-WSNE.
The proof is similar for zero-one games. The algorithm checks whether ri ≤
ri′ + (
1
2 + ) − 5 for every i ∈ [k] and every i′ ∈ Supp(x), and whether cj ≤
cj′+(
1
2 + )− 5 for every j ∈ [k] and every j′ ∈ Supp(y). If both checks succeed,
then we have that (x,y) is a ( 12 + )-WSNE. Otherwise, we can apply Lemma 9
to obtain a pair i, j ∈ [k] such that (R + C)i,j > 1 + 2−  > 1. However, since
this is a zero-one game, the only way to have (R + C)i,j > 1 is if Ri,j = 1 and
Ci,j = 1. Therefore (i, j) is a pure Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
8 A linear lower bound for finding -WSNE when  < 1
Our result in Section 3 completes the characterization of the deterministic query
complexity for -Nash equilibria for constant , but we do not have a character-
ization for -WSNE. Of course, since every -WSNE is an -Nash equilibrium,
the lower bound of Section 3 applies for  < 12 , but we do not know much about
the deterministic query complexity of -WSNE with  ≥ 12 .
In this section, we give one easy initial observation on this topic: for every
 < 1, the deterministic query complexity of finding an -WSNE is Ω(k). It
has been shown that we can always find a (1 − 1k )-Nash equilibrium using no
queries at all [8], so this lemma shows that we should expect -WSNE to behave
differently to -Nash equilibria when  > 12 .
To prove our result, we will assume that all payoff queries return payoff 0
for both the row and column player. We will show that, when all queries are
responded to in this way, all algorithms must make at least k− 1 payoff queries
in order to correctly determine an -WSNE. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let (x,y) be a -WSNE. Let r be a row that is played with proba-
bility strictly less than 1 in x. At most  probability can be assigned to columns
in r that have not been queried.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that x assigns strictly more than 
probability to unqueried columns in r. Let U = {c : (r, c) did not receive a payoff query}.
We construct a row player payoff matrix R as follows:
Ri,j =
{
1 if i = r and j ∈ U ,
0 otherwise.
This matrix is consistent with all payoff queries that have been made so far.
Since x assigns strictly more than  probability to the columns in U , the payoff
of row r is strictly greater than . Moreover, the payoff of every row i 6= r is 0.
Since r is not played with probability 1 by x, some probability must be assigned
to a row r′ with payoff 0. Therefore, we have:
Rr′ · y −Rr · y > − 0.
This proves that row r is not an -best response against y, which provides our
contradiction. uunionsq
Having shown Lemma 10, we can now provide the lower bound.
Lemma 11. For every  < 1, the deterministic query complexity of finding an
-WSNE in a k × k bimatrix game is at least k − 1, even in zero-one games.
Proof (of Lemma 11). Let (x,y) be an -WSNE. Let W be the set of rows that
are not played with probability 1 by x. Note that W contains at least k − 1
rows. By Lemma 10, in each row in W , there must be at least 1−  probability
assigned to queried columns. Since  < 1, this implies that each row in W must
have at least one queried column, which implies that we must have made at least
k − 1 queries. uunionsq
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given a complete characterization of the deterministic
query complexity of -Nash equilibria for constant , we have given randomized
upper bounds for both -Nash equilibria and -WSNE, and we have initiated
work on lower bounds against randomized algorithms for finding -Nash equilib-
ria.
There are many open problems arising from this work. In addition to ruling
out query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria, our
lower bound in Section 4 also rules out query efficient algorithms for finding
-Nash equilibria with  < 14k in k × k bimatrix games. The most obvious open
problem stemming from this is to prove a lower bound for randomized algorithms
for constant approximations. At the very least, it would be desirable to have
matching Ω(k · log k) lower bounds for our algorithms in Sections 6 and 7. Also,
does there exist a constant  < 3−
√
5
2 for which the randomized query complexity
is ω(k · log k), or a constant  < 23 for which the randomized query complexity
of finding an -WSNE is ω(k · log k)?
We adapted two approximation algorithms to give randomized query-efficient
protocols, but we do not use the best possible polynomial-time approximations.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium [16]
using gradient descent, but it is not clear how this could be efficiently imple-
mented using queries. For WSNE, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds
a ( 23 −0.004735)-WSNE [9], which uses an exhaustive search of all 2×2 supports
to improve the KS-algorithm. Even if this could be efficiently implemented using
queries, it would only be slightly better than the result in Section 7.
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